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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The European Semester is a new six-month cycle in economic policy coordination in the European 
Union that starts in January and finishes in June/July. It is based on two procedural innovations. The 
first is a shift in the timing of the budgetary process. National Governments are asked to submit their 
Stability or Convergence Programmes before they are discussed by National Parliaments and 
translated into national legislation. The aim is to strengthen economic policy coordination across 
countries by providing ex-ante guidance. The second institutional innovation is the alignment of the 
timing of fiscal and structural reform plans. EU Member States are now asked to submit Stability or 
Convergence Programmes at the same time as their National Reform Programmes, implying that 
Member States should pay more attention to complementarities and spill-over effects across policy 
areas.  
The Semester’s objectives are ambitious and its interaction with the new emerging economic 
governance framework is complicated and, to some extent, unpredictable. We analyse here the main 
challenges ahead in differentiating between effectiveness, at national and European level, and 
legitimacy challenges. 
On the first issue, effectiveness, early evidence is that countries have adapted differently to the new 
procedures depending on if they are ‘old’ or ‘new’ Member States; if their economic interests lie 
exclusively with the EU or not; and if they have strong or weak national fiscal frameworks. Second, it 
remains to be seen if an integrated legal text containing recommendations to correct the course of 
fiscal policy and intervene in individual markets through structural measures will end up 
strengthening or weakening the overall economic-governance framework. The European Parliament 
should in this context become a forum in which information is exchanged for the sake of Member 
States. Its role as guardian in the relationship between the European Commission and the Council 
should be made more visible and effective. Clearer involvement of the European Parliament would 
also reduce legitimacy concerns. 
To achieve these objectives, in this paper, we envisage a wider economic dialogue with the European 
Semester playing a central role. We envisage an Economic Dialogue with the Commission and the 
President of the European Council that largely mimics the European Central Bank’s Monetary 
Dialogue. A strong role for the European Parliament will increase the effectiveness of EU economic 
governance, even if we suggest that its involvement is limited to specific stages along the Semester 
cycle. On the other hand, we find mixed results as regards the possibility of an increased or new 
collaboration between National Parliaments and the European Parliament. The present briefing paper 
is a first investigation into the possible role of the European Parliament in the new emerging 
economic governance framework. A full study surveying also evidence on the actual experience of 
the first Semester cycle’s follow-up will be delivered in 2012.  
5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The semester’s innovations 
The sovereign debt crises that some euro-area countries have experienced during the last fifteen 
months indicate that the current design of European economic governance is not able to prevent 
crises from occurring and spreading. Along with the realisation that fiscal rules were not biting 
enough, it has also been recognised that the public sector was not solely responsible for countries’ 
indebtedness but that, especially in euro-area Member States like Portugal and Spain, the private 
sector also accumulated substantial debt in order to finance both consumption and investment.1 
Thus, an important lesson to draw from the crisis is a deeper understanding of the high level of 
interconnectedness between euro-area countries, some of which are borrowers and other lenders, 
and between policy areas, with strong feedback effects operating between the public, the private 
and the financial sectors.2 
Recent events generated momentum in favour of a reform of European economic governance. The 
European Commission submitted the main lines of the new EU governance framework on 12 May 
20103, with formal proposals in its comprehensive package of 29 September 2010 organised into six 
legislative proposals, four of which are to be approved by the Council and the European Parliament 
(EP) through the regular legislative process. 4 Current proposals include measures to strengthen 
fiscal surveillance by the Commission, enforcement through semi-automatic sanctions, and a 
completely new regulation on surveillance and sanctioning of non-fiscal macroeconomic imbalances. 
The emerging governance structure is anchored in the so-called European Semester. First proposed 
in the Commission’s Communication of 12 May 2010 and then approved by the Council on 7 
September 2010, the European Semester is a new institutional process with the ultimate aim of 
strengthening coordination between countries and of macroeconomic and structural issues. It 
consists of a cycle of economic policy coordination that lasts for about six months and is repeated 
every year. The cycle starts in each January with the presentation of the Commission’s Annual 
Growth Survey (AGS). The AGS sets a number of priorities for the EU as a whole and identifies 
objectives that would serve the fulfilment of those priorities. The Spring European Council then 
endorses the AGS after discussion in the Council and the European Parliament. The Spring European 
Council explicitly invites EU Member States to take account of the AGS in the drafting of their 
budgetary and structural reform plans, which they need to submit to the EU already in the Spring. The 
Commission is set to deliver country-specific recommendations on the basis of these documents, 
with the Council expected to adopt them no later than July. Figure 1 summarises the timetable and 
the main elements of the Semester’s governance structure. This process is based on two procedural 
innovations, each supporting a specific objective. The first is a shift in the timing of the budgetary 
process. Since the late 1990s Member States have been required to submit Stability or Convergence 
                                                 
1 Altomonte and Marzinotto (2010). 
2 Gerlach, Schulz, and Wolff (2010). 
3 Commission (2010a), Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination, COM(2010) 250, 12 May. 
4 The six legislative proposals are as follows: 1) Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) n. 1467/97 on speeding 
up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, 2) Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) n. 
1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies, 3) Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the prevention and correction of 
macroeconomic imbalances, 4) Proposal for a Council Directive on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, 
5) Proposal for a Regulation on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro-area, 6) Proposal for a Regulation 
on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro-area. 
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Programmes (SCPs) under Regulation 1466/97 as part of the Stability Pact’s preventive arm. These 
documents typically contain multi-annual budgetary projections and details of national fiscal 
consolidation strategies. Compared with practice prior to 2011, the difference now is one of timing, 
as National Governments must submit them before they are discussed in National Parliaments and 
translated into national legislation. The aim is to strengthen economic policy coordination between 
countries in the form of ex-ante guidance.  
The second institutional innovation is the alignment of the timing of fiscal and structural reform 
plans. EU Member States are now asked to submit their SCPs alongside their National Reform 
Programmes (NRPs). Introduced in their current form in March 2005 under the revamped Lisbon 
Strategy, NRPs are used by Governments to inform the EU of their multiannual commitments to 
structural interventions in the economy from pension to product, labour and capital markets 
reforms. The Semester’s prescription is that they should be submitted together with budgetary 
projections, implying that Member States need to take greater account of complementarities and 
spill-over effects between policy areas. Furthermore, the early announcement of EU priorities and 
objectives through the AGS means that ex-ante guidance is exercised not only for countries’ fiscal 
policies but also for their growth strategies, albeit with some differences in the strength and coercive 
power of EU recommendations.  
The European Council of 25 March 2011 introduced an additional tool to improve cross-country 
coordination of growth policies: it invited EU Member States to include in their upcoming reform plans 
reference to Euro-Plus Pact commitments. Initially suggested by France and Germany in early 2011 
and then adopted by the Spring European Council, the Pact lists a number of priorities that largely 
mimic the content of the January AGS (i.e. competitiveness, employment, fiscal sustainability and 
financial stability). 
 
Figure 1. The European Semester: timetable and governance 
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1.2. The legal architecture 
The legal architecture of the Semester is not free of ambiguities which – if not properly addressed – 
may give rise to institutional conflicts. The European Semester is legally enshrined in Articles 121 
and 148 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The former commits EU 
Member States to economic policy coordination and dissuades them from implementing policies that 
could endanger the proper functioning of Economic and Monetary Union. The latter brings 
employment to the centre of EU economic-policy and requires Member States to submit regular 
reports on their employment situation. The Semester is thus underpinned by a Treaty-based system 
of surveillance and ex-post monitoring that recognises specific roles for the European Commission, 
the Council and the European Parliament. The fact that it is Treaty-based is, however, not sufficient to 
solve some legal ambiguities.  
In practice, the European Semester builds on the Integrated Guidelines for Growth and Jobs (IGs) 
adopted in March 2005, which combined the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPGs) and the 
Employment Guidelines (EGs) into a single document for the first time, each one in fact regulated by 
Articles 121 and 148 TFEU respectively. In turn, just like the IGs (BEPGs + EGs), part of the 
Semester’s overarching framework relies on non-binding EU recommendations; this is indeed the 
case for measures that concern structural reform for example in the areas of welfare and labour 
markets. Nevertheless, the indications coming from the EU become binding and may lead eventually 
to sanctions if a country is made subject of the Stability Pact’s Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and 
the new Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP). Under the current framework, failure to meet the 
Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit target in the coming years will indeed activate the EDP and, with it, 
a legislative process in which adjustment by the problematic Member States in question is 
mandatory.  
 
Figure 2. The European Semester: Treaty base 
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Procedure              Procedure 
 
At the same time, failure to address structural problems that cause persistent macroeconomic 
imbalances will lead to the activation of the new EIP, which is expected to rely on similar coercive 
methods to the EDP. The legal ambiguities derive thus from the fact that the European Semester 
brings together two procedures (the Stability Pact’s preventive arm and the IGs) that generate two 
different types of legislative acts. The Commission recommendation on SCPs provides the basis for a 
binding Council opinion, whereas its recommendation on NRPs informs a non-binding Council 
recommendation. On 7 June 2011, however, the Commission submitted country-specific 
recommendations in an integrated legal text merging recommendations for the two procedures in a 
single document. It remains an open question whether overall surveillance in the EU will be enhanced 
or not under this new procedure, a topic we will address below. 
The rest of the contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 lists the challenges ahead. Section 3 
describes the case selection and the rationale behind it. Section 4 provides preliminary evidence on 
the adaptation of a sample of EU countries to the first Semester cycle. Section 5 discusses the 
problems associated with the integrated approach and the position of the Commission in the 
legislative process. Section 6 looks at the involvement of National Parliaments based on original 
survey-based evidence. Section 7 addresses explicitly the question of the role of the European 
Parliament. Section 8 offers policy recommendations relating to the involvement of the European 
Parliament, National Parliaments, and the European Commission.  
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2. THE CHALLENGES: EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY  
2.1. Effectiveness 
The Semester has ambitious objectives and how it will fit into the new emerging economic 
governance framework is a complicated and, to some extent, ambiguous issue. We analyse here the 
main challenges ahead, differentiating between effectiveness, at the national and European levels, 
and legitimacy challenges. 
A first question is if the European Semester is and will be effective. Typically, policy effectiveness is 
defined as how well a particular instrument achieves a given policy objective.5 In a multi-level 
framework such as the EU, multiple actors employ similar or dissimilar policy instruments to achieve 
the same overall policy objective. When it comes to economic policy coordination, it is certainly 
necessary to distinguish between developments at national and EU levels. We thus look at 
effectiveness from two perspectives: national and European.  
2.1.1. The national level  
A first question is to what extent national Governments have adapted to the new process and rules, 
thereby creating the necessary conditions for enhanced coordination between countries and policy 
areas. It is too early to draw definitive conclusions, but the preliminary evidence shows that Member 
States have, in this first round, adapted differently to the new process depending on their historical 
relationships with the EU, their contribution to the launch of economic policy coordination initiatives 
(e.g. the Euro-Plus Pact), the strength of their commitment to macroeconomic adjustment and their 
national fiscal frameworks.  
2.1.2. The European level  
The second question is if the new framework is able to deliver on surveillance, a result that would 
depend on the Semester’s fit within the emerging economic governance structure. The role of the 
Commission in the Semester is not assessed enough, and this point is important — the effectiveness 
of the Semester is likely to depend not only on Member States’ capacities to adapt to it, but also on 
the Commission’s ability to deliver the required early and integrated surveillance. More precisely, we 
will explore here the role of the Commission versus the Council, and the relative advantages of the 
integrated approach in the preparation of country-specific recommendations. 
2.2. Legitimacy 
Another key issue is the extent to which the process is legitimate. Political science literature has 
devoted much attention to the role of legitimacy in policy-making processes. Scharpf (1999) 
considers the issue of legitimacy in the EU, using the classification developed in Scharpf (1970), 
which focuses on both input-oriented and output-oriented legitimacy. Input-oriented legitimacy is 
the extent to which there is Government by the people, that is, the extent to which the people 
participate directly in decisions. Output-oriented legitimacy, in turn, is the extent to which a decision 
is for the people, that is, the extent to which a given decision is in the best general welfare interest of 
the population. Scharpf (1999) discussed the role of the European Parliament, stating that the 
                                                 
5 On the use of the concept of policy effectiveness in public policy analysis, see for example Heritier (2003). 
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institution by itself could not provide input-oriented legitimacy because of the lack of a 'thick' 
common identity among EU Member State populations. National Government involvement in 
decisions therefore remains important because national Governments provide most of the input-
oriented legitimacy. When it comes to output-oriented legitimacy, there are several ways to increase 
it, according to Scharpf. Electoral accountability that allows populations to replace Governments that 
act contrary to their interests is one. A closely related feature is checks and balances on the actions 
of Government. Independent bodies that make decisions in the common interests of the population 
are appropriate and welcome in areas where direct electoral accountability would be unsuited. 
2.2.1. Input legitimacy  
When considering the legitimacy of the European Semester, institutional features are therefore 
important. On the input side, European Parliament and National Parliament involvement in the 
process is important. However, there are two main reasons for questioning whether input legitimacy 
exists under the new procedures.  
First, the European Parliament plays a minor role in the European Semester process.6 On the basis of 
Article 121 TFEU and Article 148 TFEU, the Council shall inform the European Parliament of the 
adopted country-specific recommendations around July. In the present report, we look at if greater 
involvement and a more active role for the Parliament is desirable to increase legitimacy, and, if yes, 
how it should be achieved.  
Second, the early discussion of fiscal and reform plans and the short period that countries have to 
finalise their SCPs and NRPs limit their capacity to involve National Parliaments. This time issue 
inevitably poses legitimacy concerns, in this case at national level. At the same time, however, a 
benign interpretation of this development is that National Parliaments may be informed of economic 
policy plans early in the year before the standard budgetary process has started. One could, of 
course, argue that national Government involvement suffices, but national Governments alone may 
take steps that are counter to the European interest. In these cases, independent bodies should play 
a role to assure adequate output legitimacy. In the European context, the Commission is the obvious 
player.  
2.2.2. Output legitimacy  
Transparency plays a key role and is a pre-condition for assessing the degree of output legitimacy of 
any decision. Thus, for the European Semester to be legitimate it is necessary that the issues at 
stake are clear and transparent. Unfortunately, the first cycle of the European Semester is 
characterised by some grey areas. For example, in general, our review of the evidence is that the 
Council’s country-specific documents at the end of the cycle water down many of the Commission’s 
recommendations. This undermines the credibility of the AGS upon which the Commission’s 
recommendations are based and thus also the transparency of the European Semester, depriving 
the entire process of the pre-conditions for output legitimacy. We believe that the European 
Parliament may indeed play a stronger role in the dissemination and interpretation of the priorities 
and objectives identified at the beginning of each year for the purpose of transparency. The 
Parliament can serve as an institutional check to be sure that Council revisions to Commission 
recommendations do not undermine the general welfare of European citizens. 
                                                 
6 Similarly, the European Parliament’s impact on the BEPGs, upon which the Semester’s AGS is based, was also minimal. 
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3. MEMBER STATE EXAMPLES  
For the purposes of the present study, we have selected six EU countries: Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Hungary and Ireland. They represent large and small Member States; countries that joined 
the European Union at different times; countries that have adopted the euro and countries that are 
still outside; countries whose main trading partner is the rest of the EU and others whose economic 
interests lie also outside; countries that are and are not under EU-IMF conditionality; and countries 
that vary in their use of multi-annual fiscal frameworks in their domestic budget systems. Hallerberg, 
Strauch, and von Hagen (2009) argue that there are two ways institutionally to centralise the 
budget process to promote greater fiscal discipline. The first involves delegating powers of decision 
to a strong Ministry of Finance (MoF). The second involves fiscal contracts between parties in 
coalition. In the latter case, the 'contract' serves not only a fiscal objective but also a political one. 
Multi-annual fiscal plans are more likely to be detailed, and to be honoured, under a 'contract' form of 
fiscal governance. Moreover, as Annett (2006) noted in his study for the IMF, Member States with 
contracts use the EU-level rules to reinforce their own domestic rules. For this reason, one may 
expect that 'contract' fiscal governance countries would be more likely to integrate elements of the 
European Semester into their domestic frameworks than would 'delegating' states. The extent to 
which each country fits the theoretical ideal type varies, however, as we will explain below. Annex II 
gives details for each of the six countries we have selected.  
It is possible to assume that the features mentioned above partly explain countries’ approaches to 
the European Semester. 'New' Member States may be more inclined to follow the new procedure as 
accurately as possible. Older Member States that have demonstrated historically a strong interest in 
economic policy coordination, in whatever form, may try to interpret the European Semester in a 
more original fashion; the Franco-German initiative for a Euro-Plus Pact would support this 
hypothesis. Countries whose sole trading partner is in the euro area or in the EU would be more 
committed to ex ante economic-policy coordination between countries and policy areas. For 
countries under conditionality, the first European Semester cycle should not be relevant as their 
economic policy strategy is in any case strictly defined by and designed according to their individual 
adjustment programmes. Finally, stronger national fiscal frameworks would adapt better and more 
promptly to the new framework than weak ones.  
Estonia is a small Member State that joined the EU in 2004. It has a proportional representation 
electoral system. It is a contract state in terms of fiscal governance. The 'contracts', however, are not 
that developed — while there is some basis for medium-term fiscal planning and ex ante 
coordination with the aim of fixing fiscal targets, there is little consistency between multi-annual and 
annual targets.7 
Finland is a small country that joined the EU in 1995. The Finnish electoral system is based on 
proportional representation; and is characterised by many political parties, high variance of 
ideological preferences, and relatively frequent Government changeovers. In line with the contract 
approach, at the end of December of the previous year, individual Ministries propose spending limits 
for the next three years to the Ministry of Finance; quantitative limits are eventually agreed on in 
March; Ministries will exploit the time from then to mid-September to specify and then negotiate with 
the MoF the contents of their spending plans. The country enjoys a very strong Medium-term 
                                                 
7 See the Commission’s Fiscal Governance Database. 
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Budgetary Framework (MTBF); there is a national multiannual plan that compounds the Stability 
Programmes submitted to the EU and this is well coordinated with the annual budgetary process.  
France and Germany are both large states and EU founding members. Both countries also follow a 
delegated approach. In terms of electoral system, France has a form of plurality while Germany has a 
two-ballot system, with the first ballot based on plurality and the second proportional 
representation. The distribution of seats depends mostly on the proportional representation ballot. 
In France, survey-based evidence provided by the Commission points to the existence of a highly 
developed MTBF with the strong involvement of Parliament8, but in fact our evidence specifically 
addressing the role of National Parliaments shows a more nuanced picture. Parliament debated 
fiscal and structural plans in 2010 but not in 2011, and there are no plans to do so in 2012 because 
of scheduled elections. The German 'Medium Term Financial Plan' provides multi-annual targets that 
are at times detailed, but they are indicative only and they do not structure future spending to the 
extent found in Finland. 
Hungary joined the EU in 2004 and is not yet part of the euro area. Given that it has a one-party 
Government it should be a delegating state, although in practice the Finance Minister is 
institutionally weak when compared to other EU countries (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 2010). In 
formal terms according to the Commission’s (2009) assessment of medium-term frameworks, 
Hungary has a framework as strong as Finland’s, but in practice the Government has not maintained 
the spending limits promised in those frameworks to the same degree as Finland, and the MTFF in 
practice is indicative only (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen 2010). 
Ireland is a small country that joined the EU in 1973 and is the only country in our sample that was 
under EU and IMF conditionality during the first Semester cycle. It has a single transferable vote 
electoral system. It is would be a 'contract' county according to the terminology of Hallerberg et al., 
although the nature of the 'contract' today focuses on what the Government (both the previous and 
current) has promised the EU and IMF.  
In the following two sections, we assess the degree to which this set of Member States have 
integrated the European Semester according to what they have submitted under National Stability or 
Convergence Programmes and National Reform Programmes. We also consider if and how National 
Parliaments have responded. 
                                                 
8 See above. 
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4. EFFECTIVENESS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL: STABILITY/ CONVERGENCE 
PROGRAMMES AND NATIONAL REFORMS PROGRAMMES 
KEY FINDINGS 
• Member States have adapted differently to the European Semester.  
• Ownership of and adherence to the new economic policy coordination cycle appears 
strongest in the new Member States (Estonia and Hungary); not relevant in countries under 
programmes (Ireland); strong but more freely interpreted in the larger old Member States 
(France and Germany) and weaker in small newish Member States that entertain intensive 
economic relations with countries outside the euro area or the EU (Finland).  
 
 
We isolate three indicators that should provide insights into Member States’ adaptation to the 
Semester: i) ownership of the cycle; ii) the relative strength of ex ante guidance; and iii) the adoption 
of an integrated approach (i.e. the acknowledgment of spill-over effects between fiscal actions and 
structural reforms). The analysis is based on an assessment of national SCPs and NRPs. Table 1 
contains information on the submission schedule.  
 
Table 1: Submission’s schedule 
  
 SCP NRP COM Rec. COUNCIL Rec. 
Estonia 29.04.2011 29.04.2011  07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
Finland 06.04.2011 06.04.2011  07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
France 03.05.2011 03.05.2011 07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
Germany 27.04.2011 07.04.2011 07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
Hungary 15.04.2011 15.04.2011 07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
Ireland 29.04.2011 29.04.2011 07.06.2011 12.07.2011 
Source: DGECFIN and national sources.  
 
 
The level of ownership in each country is assessed by accounting for explicit references to the 
European Semester cycle in national fiscal and structural plans. Member States that explicitly 
mention the European Semester and/or provide details about their effort to adjust to the new 
procedure are said to have a stronger sense of ownership than countries in which the new procedure 
is not even explicitly referenced.  
Second, we assess the success of ex-ante guidance. To do so, we focus on the contents of the AGS 
and the extent to which national plans mirror both the priorities and the objectives identified in the 
Commission’s documents. The first Semester cycle started with the submission by the Commission 
of the first AGS on 12 January 2011. Annex I provides a list of its policy priorities and objectives. The 
document identifies three policy priorities: fiscal consolidation, labour market reform and growth-
enhancing measures. In turn, the Commission identifies ten objectives that support these three 
priorities: i) rigorous fiscal consolidation, ii) the correction of macroeconomic imbalances, iii) 
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stability in the financial sector, iv) higher labour market participation v) pension system reform, vi) 
lower unemployment, vii) flexicurity, viii) the completion of the Single Market, ix) greater use of 
private capital to finance growth, and x) cost-effective access to energy.9 We assume that ex ante 
guidance in the form of the AGS is more successful the more explicitly Member State endorse the AGS 
and adopt measures consistent with the AGS’ objectives.  
Third, we evaluate the extent to which Governments in the selected countries have adopted an 
integrated approach in the sense that they have acknowledged and possibly quantified spill-over 
effects across macroeconomic and structural measures, ranging from the fiscal consequences of 
reform to the incorporation of reform scenarios in budgetary projections. 
The French and German documents contain references to the European Semester and in particular to 
the Franco-German initiative for a Euro-Plus Pact. They are thus characterised by a strong political 
commitment to economic policy coordination in the euro area. France recognises the role of the 
Semester especially in the area of structural reforms, as in its NRP, while the Stability Programme 
builds on previous EU assessments of French fiscal plans. The German Government, on the other 
hand, seems wary of ex-ante coordination under the European Semester more in the fiscal arena 
than in the area of structural reform.10 In the French NRP, there is a high degree of adherence to the 
AGS, with strong emphasis on the sustainability of public finances, pension reform, labour market 
inclusion, flexicurity, more efficient use of resources to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, access to 
SMEs and stronger competition in post and telecommunications, transport and electricity. The 
structural interventions identified in the German NRP relate to increasing labour market 
participation, improving conditions for R&D and innovation, reducing emissions and investing in 
cost-efficient renewable energies, improving educational attainment and promoting social inclusion. 
Finally, with reference to the recognition of complementarities between policy areas, the French 
Government recognises the potential for spill-over effects across policy domains but these are 
quantified only in the Stability Programme. The opposite occurs in the German documents. Only the 
German NRP contains indications about spill-over effects, the size of which is also quantified; on the 
other hand, there is less on the integrated approach in the Stability Programme. 
Estonia and Finland also have strong national specificities, though for different reasons. The 
Estonian documents contain references to the European Semester, Europe2020 and the Euro-Plus 
Pact. By contrast, the Finnish documents do not make explicit reference to the new logic of the 
European Semester in either document.11 As to the strength of ex-ante guidance, the Estonian NRPs 
emphasise the achievement of a medium-term budgetary objective (MTO) of surplus, improving the 
sustainability of social expenditure, continuing the gradual reduction of taxes on labour and profits, 
and increasing taxes on consumption and energy, avoiding macroeconomic imbalances, even if 
precise interventions are not identified, increasing youth employment, and implementing long-term 
structural changes in the energy sector. There is also awareness of the spill-over across the fiscal 
and the structural domains and an indication of the cumulative impact of measures. In the Finnish 
NRP, there is an emphasis on the need to guarantee the sustainability of public finances, support 
employment and fix climate and energy targets. There is little acknowledgment of the spill-over 
                                                 
9 The first multiannual BEPGs of 2003-2005 – the natural precedent of the AGS - listed 27 guidelines. The BEPGs for 2005-2008 
reduced them to 16. By bringing them to 10, the AGS makes further progress into the streamlining of economic policy guidelines. 
10 “By pursuing the line of fiscal policy presented in this Stability Programme, Germany will fully comply with these (i.e. excessive 
deficit procedure) requirements. The economic policy components of the consolidation procedure are contained in the National 
Reform Programme, and the measures therein with financial impact are simultaneously covered by the fiscal strategy and 
projection for public finances that are contained in the Stability Programme” (German Stability Programme). 
11 The documents were put together before the general election. 
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effects across the fiscal and other macroeconomic domains and no estimation of the impact of the 
suggested measure.  
Finally, both Hungary and Ireland are special cases, the former for not being a euro-area member, for 
having held the EU Presidency in the first Semester cycle and for being in fact under post-programme 
surveillance after having received financial support from the EU under the so-called Medium-Term 
Financial Assistance (MTFA) facility. Ireland, on the other hand was under conditionality in the first 
Semester cycle. The Hungarian documents suggest a very high level of commitment to the European 
Semester as well as to the Euro-Plus Pact, to which non-euro area members can only commit on a 
voluntary basis. The NRP is well-aligned with the AGS, including measures to increase the 
sustainability of public finances, increase labour market participation, reform the pension system 
and social protection, boost vocational training and incentivise the use of renewables. There is also 
great attention devoted to spill–over effects both in the Stability Programme and in the NRP. 
Submitted on 29 April, the Irish Stability Programme and NRP largely mimic the commitments the 
country has taken on board with the adjustment programme agreed with the EU and the IMF. For a 
country under conditionality, in fact, the strong umbrella for coordination provided by the European 
Semester has no relevance since the country is obliged to stick to the detailed fiscal and reform plan. 
In turn, none of the documents explicitly refer to the new framework. The listed measures are those 
of the adjustment plan, and the NRP is mostly developed along EU2020 guidelines rather than being 
explicitly tailored around the AGS. There is also no attention to spill-over effects, but these may be 
implicit in the adjustment plan agreed with EU authorities.  
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5. EFFECTIVENESS AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL: CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATED ANALYSIS 
AND POLICY FORMULATION 
KEY FINDINGS 
• EU Institutions need to adapt to the new economic policy coordination cycle. The 
Commission will have to identify the optimal fiscal and structural stance early on and 
prioritise across policy areas and countries. 
• The interaction between the European Semester and the new economic governance is 
ambiguous. It is not clear how the use of an integrated legal text will affect surveillance. 
Moreover, the Council’s rationale for departing from some of the Commission’s country-
specific recommendations is not transparent.    
 
The European Semester requires the analysis and formulation of policies to be integrated across 
countries and across policy areas. The alignment of the SCP and NRP in Member States and the 
renewed emphasis on the relevance of complementarities between fiscal policy and structural 
questions requires the identification and prioritisation of policy measures. This is a challenging task 
for the Commission. 
5.1. The choice of optimal fiscal and structural policy 
First, the ex-ante nature of the European Semester requires the Commission to come to an 
assessment of optimal fiscal and structural policy earlier in the process. For this, it needs to 
formulate earlier than under the old regime its view on the optimal fiscal stance for the euro area as a 
whole and the corresponding optimal level of deficits in line with Treaty obligations for the different 
Member States. This guidance needs to be grounded in solid analysis to convince National 
Parliaments of the importance of keeping to the proposed budget levels. Intervening early may also 
represent a risk in case economic circumstances change rapidly, but this risk must be weighed 
against the cost of less coordination and guidance. The AGS may be more effective in the area of 
structural policy, where circumstances change less quickly, than in the area of fiscal policy, where 
sudden macroeconomic shocks may require quick action. 
5.2. Prioritisation across policy areas 
Second, it will be challenging to prioritise across policy areas. For example, the European Commission 
may highlight as it did in its first AGS that economic growth as well as high employment are areas of 
key importance. After an endorsement and confirmation of these overarching goals by the European 
Council, the Member State will then need to translate these goals into concrete policy measures in 
their NRPs. The Commission assesses these measures in a recommendation for a Council 
recommendation on the NRPs. In this recommendation, the Commission prioritises the policy areas 
in which action should be taken in the next year. This evidently involves a judgement by the 
Commission. In the recommendations published on 7 June 2011, a prioritisation is made. However, it 
is not transparent how and on what grounds this prioritisation was reached. While many of the 
recommendations appear to be completely sensible, greater transparency would help increase 
ownership and in turn foster effectiveness, also at the national level.  
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5.3. Political and economic trade-offs 
Third, there are also cases in which policy recommendations may be subject to political and 
economic trade-offs. For example, pension reform may be economically necessary but may involve 
short-term economic costs in the introduction phase. Such a reform may also incur significant 
political costs, which may prevent the Government from undertaking equally important reforms of 
the labour market. While the Commission may form a view on the relative political feasibility, 
ultimately it is a difficult exercise to calibrate political and economic trade-offs. It therefore becomes 
all the more important that economic prioritisation by the Commission in its recommendation for a 
Council recommendation is well explained and justified. 
5.4. Prioritisation across countries 
Fourth, the Commission chose to give policy recommendations to all 27 Member States, treating 
them all, except for the countries receiving financial assistance in a programme, on an equal footing. 
This policy decision may make more pertinent and biting surveillance more difficult. So far, the 
Commission has not attempted to differentiate and prioritise policy actions across countries; 
therefore it is difficult for the Council to prioritise the urgency of policy actions across countries. Put 
differently, should a policy recommendation given to a troubled country not be more urgent than a 
policy recommendation to a country without major economic difficulties? The current way of 
presenting recommendations suggests that all countries need to take policy actions in an equally 
urgent way. It also remains to be seen how the analysis of cross-country spill-overs can be improved 
in the current set-up, which focuses on individual economies. Clearly it would be a task for the 
Commission to guide the Council on which countries they should pay particular attention to. 
5.5. Interaction with the new economic governance framework  
Fifth, it remains to be seen how the European Semester will interact with the new EU economic 
governance framework emerging from the reform of financial supervision, the currently debated 
governance package and the Euro-Plus Pact. The currently debated governance pact includes a 
regulation on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. This regulation has an 
overlapping Treaty base with the BEPGs and the related NRPs, namely Article 121 TFEU. The 
Commission is designing an early-warning mechanism to issue policy recommendations suitable to 
prevent macroeconomic imbalances. Here, it will be important to draw a clear line between the 
regular NRP process and the preventive arm of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure. This could be 
done, for example, on the basis of the severity of the potential imbalance and the extent of spill-overs 
arising from the imbalances. These two criteria will be all the more important for the corrective arm of 
the EIP, which should kick in in case of severe imbalances threatening the functioning of EMU. The 
corrective arm of the EIP is likely to be very intrusive in terms of economic policy recommendations, 
and will ultimately lead to sanctions. In some policy areas, the EIP and the newly founded European 
Systemic Risk Board are likely to overlap12. Here it will be of great importance to avoid institutional 
conflict and benefit from the relative strength of different institutions to reach an effective policy 
solution. Finally, the Euro-Plus Pact is an important political-commitment device at the head of state 
and Government level, even if monitoring stays in the Commission’s hands. Content-wise, it overlaps 
significantly with the regular Treaty-based procedures. In sum, there is a considerable number of 
                                                 
12 Wolff [2011]. 
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different procedures emerging or already in place (see for example Figure 2). Given the high number 
of procedures and the confusion that might arise from it, political commitment and action on all 
fronts will be extremely important to the success of the Semester process. Ideally, Member States 
should back the regular Treaty-based surveillance by strengthening the Commission's independence 
and acting decisively in the Council and at home once recommendations are issued. 
5.6. The challenges of an integrated legal text  
Sixth, and perhaps most importantly, while the Commission states that the SCP and NRP are legally 
separate, this does not appear to be the case. In fact, for each Member State, on 7 June 2011 the 
Commission issued a 'Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the NRP of [country x] and 
delivering a Council opinion on the updated Stability Programme of [country x]'. Previously, the 
Council opinion has been a separate legal instrument to the Council recommendation on the NRP. By 
combining them in one document, analysis and policy recommendations get integrated. What used 
to be the Council opinion is no longer a separate legal instrument as required by Regulation 1466/97 
(the preventive arm of the SGP). It is included in the Council recommendation as expression of the 
Council's view on the SCPs. This comes with significant risks and it could ultimately undermine the 
effectiveness of fiscal surveillance for a number of reasons: (a) within the Commission, the 
integration across policy areas could lead to weakening of the analysis and the subsequent policy 
conclusions on fiscal policy (aspects of fiscal discipline can be traded-off against other policy 
objectives). By opening up the document to include both policy areas, it is possible that different 
Directorates-General (DGs) might have a say on the overall messages of the document, thereby 
undermining the stringency of analysis and leading to faulty compromises; (b) by having one 
integrated document, several different Council formations will discuss the same document, 
potentially leading to an overlap. Political horse-trading could further undermine the stringency of 
recommendations issued by the Council in the area of fiscal policy. On the other hand, it is of course 
also possible that the integration will help finance ministers to convince other Ministries more easily 
of the necessity of addressing fiscal policy sustainability. Overall, it will be important that fiscal 
discipline cannot be traded-off against other policy objectives, and that structural reforms are not 
delayed when the fiscal situation is benign. 
5.7. The Council acting on the basis of a Commission recommendation 
A final and very important issue is the extent to which policy recommendations given by the 
European Commission are watered down in the Council. In this note we have not conducted a 
systematic evaluation of this but preliminary evidence suggests that the recommendations become 
weaker in some cases in the Council.13 This may be legitimate. However, this should happen in a 
transparent way. The European Parliament could play an important role in this regard by asking the 
Council to be transparent about its decisions and justify its actions, a topic we will elaborate on 
further below. 
                                                 
13 For example, the Council recommendation on Italy: the Commission recommended that the process of opening up the services 
sector to further competition should be extended 'in particular in the field of professional services', while the Council 
recommendation changes 'in particular' to 'including', a significant weakening in emphasis. Similarly, there is evidence for such 
weakening in Hungary and a number of other countries of our sample. 
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6. ONE ASPECT OF INPUT LEGITIMACY: THE ROLE OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE 
FIRST CYCLE 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The adaptation of National Parliaments to the European Semester is strongly affected by the 
nature and strength of national fiscal frameworks 
• There is more scrutiny of SCP in Parliamentary Committees under the new system, even if 
such scrutiny was mostly behind closed doors.  
• Weaker National Parliaments are those that are more strongly in favour of an involvement of 
the European Parliament in the Semester cycle. But only an involvement with the plenary 
would provide added value to such collaboration.  
 
 
National parliaments can play an important, and useful, role in the European Semester. They already 
have mechanisms in place to scrutinise their country's annual budget proposals, they have to 
approve that budget, and they all investigate ex-post how the budget was executed. They represent 
the principle source of input legitimacy in Europe's parliamentary democracies and must surely be 
one target audience for the European Semester. The change in the calendar for when a Government 
writes and submits a SCP may mean that the National parliament receives more detailed information 
about its Government’s plans earlier. Parliaments also have some ability to change the Government’s 
budget. If the Government ignores the advice it gets under the European Semester, it is possible that 
a Parliament may react on its own. In addition to the domestic arena, we also explore if there might 
be useful interaction between National parliaments and the European Parliament under the 
European Semester. 
For this preliminary report, we conducted a survey on the role National Parliaments play in the six 
Member States under study (see Annex III).14 Before discussing the details, it is important to note 
that one country, Ireland, is generally not relevant for most of the questions we asked. It abolishes 
its Committees after each election and creates new ones under a new Government. The new 
Committees post the 25 February 2011 elections had not been formed in time to be relevant for the 
first cycle of the European Semester. The information we have is based on past behaviour only, and 
in general the Irish Parliament (the Oireachtas) has been a weak player in any case. Government 
Ministers inform Parliament of submissions to the EU, but there have not been planned debates. The 
main role of the Irish Parliament has been to provide an ex post audit of the Government’s budget, 
rather than to play a role in the initial formation of multi-annual plans or in the design of budgets. 
A first issue to explore is the relative power of a National Parliament to change the Government’s 
budget. We expect actual changes of any significant magnitude to be rare; party discipline is high in 
many Member States, which means that Governments with majorities usually pass their budgets, 
and Governments have the ability to hold a vote of confidence on the budget where necessary. 
Nevertheless, more powerful Parliaments may have the ability to impress upon Governments their 
concerns, and there may be a connection between their ability to change the budget, the amount of 
                                                 
14 The survey questions are reproduced in Annex III.  
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monitoring they do, and whether the Government needs to pay attention to what the members of 
Parliament say. 
We examine i) if a Parliament can propose a budget independently of Government; ii) if it can 
propose amendments; iii) if those amendments are limited; iv) if amendments face an offset rule so 
that increased spending must be matched with spending cuts; v) if they are offsetting relative to the 
budget balance; and vi) if amendments can cause the fall of a Government. One can create an ordinal 
score for the strength of Parliament on the budget that ranges from 0 to 6 based on these 
questions.15 The strongest Parliament is in Finland, with a score of 5, followed by Germany (4), 
Estonia (2), France (2), Hungary (1) and Ireland (0).16 
The second theme to explore is the role Parliaments have played to date in multi-annual planning. Is 
there a multi-annual fiscal plan the Government uses in addition to its SCP? If so, does the general 
plenary debate the plan? Does it vote and approve a multi-annual plan? We ask the same questions 
for a country’s SCP – does the Parliament discuss and vote on a Government’s SCP? We assume that 
this type of scrutiny would be public and most likely to receive any press attention. Finally, we are 
interested in the timing of any debate. Does the timing suggest that the Government would be able to 
adjust its plans and/or that the timing corresponds to the timing of the Semester, or does it come 
late in the calendar so that the Government is essentially informing Parliament of its plans? 
Within our sample, two countries – Finland and Germany – regularly have plenary debates 
concerning their Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans. The timing of the debate traditionally in 
Finland is in April, but this debate will take place in October this year because of recent elections, and 
it is uncertain when the debate will take place next year. In Germany, there are two debates, in 
September and in November. The Estonian Parliament had a debate on the Government’s multi-
annual fiscal plans in May 2011, but this was exceptional – there was not a similar debate in 2010 
and none is currently planned for 2012. Similarly, the French Parliament debated the Government’s 
multi-annual fiscal plans in 2010 but not in 2011, and there are no plans to do so in 2012. Among our 
sample, Finland is the only country where the Parliament has a vote on the Government’s multi-
annual plans and where parliamentary approval is expected. Turning to a Government’s SCP, in no 
country does the plenary debate or approve what the Government submits to the European 
Commission, and in no country are there plans to introduce any plenary consideration in 2012. 
We then ask the same questions for parliamentary Committees. One finding is that the new timing for 
when a SCP is to be submitted has led to more consideration of it in parliamentary Committees. In 
2010 in Germany, the Committee did not discuss the German Stability Programme, but it did discuss 
the Programme in April 2011 and there is anticipation that the next Programme will be discussed in 
April 2012.17 In France, the Committee on Finance, the General Economy, and the Control of the 
Budget discussed the Government’s Stability Programme in April 2011 and voted on it in June. Unlike 
in Germany, however, in the other countries there are no plans to have the same practices in place in 
2012. In Hungary, the Committee on Audit Office and Budget briefly considered it, while the 
Committee on European Affairs spent more time on it. Once again, this was not the practice in 2010. 
These changes are in addition to regular discussions of Stability Programmes in Committees in 
Estonia and Finland, which were held in 2010, but with changes in the calendar to align timing with 
                                                 
15 A Parliament receives a score of 1 if the answer to questions 1-2 and 6 are yes and if 3 and 4-5 are no. 
16 The Finnish Parliament also has the right to vote on Finland’s contribution under the European Financial Stability Facility when 
funds are dispersed to a given Member State. 
17 Concerning the Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans, the Budget Committee discusses them twice, in July and in November, but 
it holds no vote on them. 
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the deadline for submission to the EU. Like Hungary, Estonia had its European Affairs Committee, in 
addition to its Budget Committee, consider its SCP.18 
While the regular discussion of a country’s SCP in its Parliament opens up a possible channel for 
communication and even coordination with the European Parliament and with other EU institutions 
such as the Commission, there is a potential practical problem. In the Budget Committees in Estonia, 
Finland, France and Germany the discussion are held in private. This is intentional. The sense is that 
one can have honest discussions as to whether the Government’s fiscal plans are realistic only if 
they are not for attribution. One participant in the survey noted that public debates quickly turn into 
'shopping window politics', with members of Parliament instinctively saying whatever the party line 
is if they know that their comments will appear somewhere else later. It is also noteworthy that the 
country where these discussions are open, Hungary, also has one of the weakest Parliaments in 
institutional terms.  
Finally, there was a series of questions as to whether a given Parliament planned to initiate reforms 
to coordinate with the Semester and if it would be useful for a national Parliament to engage in a joint 
debate on the Semester. No respondent indicated that reforms were forthcoming because of the 
introduction of the European Semester. There was, however, an interesting split on whether a joint 
debate would be useful. Respondents from Estonia, Hungary and France welcomed such a 
possibility. The Estonian commented that 'it’s important to step-by-step increase the role of the 
Parliament in a joint debate on the European Semester with the European Parliament', the Hungarian 
noted that 'a joint meeting or debate with the National Parliaments and European Parliament on the 
European Semester may pave the way for closer cooperation on this issue', while the French person 
stated that 'the National Parliaments and the European Parliament have a joint interest in 
exchanging views on the procedures of the European Semester: calendars, objectives, and 
modalities of eventual sanctions'. 
In Finland and Germany, however, there was not the same level of enthusiasm, with the first insisting 
that this 'would be contrary to the treaties' while the second answered cautiously that any such 
decision is a political one. The sample is small, but one can speculate that the responses are due to 
the relative strength of the respective Parliament given that the weaker ones welcome European 
Parliament participation. 
Returning to the theme of whether the European Semester enhances legitimacy, the results are 
decidedly mixed. There was more scrutiny of the SCP in Parliamentary Committees under the new 
system. Given that MPs are representatives of the people, this enhances input-oriented legitimacy. 
Some countries such as France, however, unfortunately do not plan to continue this practice. Most of 
this additional scrutiny at Committee level was behind closed doors and the average citizen did not 
have a chance to learn about it. While plenary sessions are generally open and provide one possible 
forum, in no country was there a plenary debate on a given SCP. The results on if European 
Parliamentary involvement together with a National Parliament is desirable are intriguing, given that 
weaker Parliaments would prefer such involvement. They suggest that the European Parliament may 
be able to compensate for some deficiencies at the national level were it European Parliament to play 
such a role. But once again the lack of transparency within Committees could be an issue. It is hard to 
see how ex-ante coordination between the European Parliament and a national Parliament could 
                                                 
18 One question also asked whether the respondent knew of any case where a Government proposed an updated budget after 
receiving critical comments from the ECOFIN Council. No respondent could remember such a case. 
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take place, let alone be effective, if they are held only at the Committee level. They would have to 
involve the plenary, which given the lack of plenary interest so far does not seem likely. 
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7. THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
KEY FINDINGS 
• The European Parliament can play an important role as a forum for the exchange of 
information and a watchdog in the relationship between the Commission and the Council that 
would serve the purpose of increasing the European Semester’s effectiveness and 
legitimacy. 
• We propose an Economic Dialogue on the European Semester that should mimic the 
Monetary Dialogue. 
 
 
As already mentioned, it is still not clear how the European Semester will fit into the emerging new 
economic governance framework including the Euro-Plus Pact and the governance package still 
under discussion. The role of the European Parliament may be better defined once the overall 
governance framework becomes clearer. We will provide a more detailed proposal on the exact role of 
the European Parliament in the full study to be delivered in 2012. In the present paper, we propose a 
stronger role for the European Parliament in more general terms. Still, we anticipate here some 
specific recommendations, in the next section, on the points during the process when the 
involvement of the European Parliament would be most appropriate. 
The initial European Semester proposal foresaw a relatively minor role for the European Parliament. 
The plenary held a discussion on the Commission’s AGS in February and was informed by the Council 
of the agreed country-specific recommendations, as foreseen in Article 121 TFEU.  
The main challenges for the European Semester are to ensure its effectiveness and the legitimacy of 
the process. As to its effectiveness, the preliminary evidence is that countries have adapted 
differently to the new procedures depending on whether they are 'old' or 'new' Member States; if their 
economic interests lie exclusively with the EU or not; and if they have strong or weak national fiscal 
frameworks. Secondly, it remains to be seen if an integrated legal text containing recommendations 
to correct the course of fiscal policy and intervene on individual markets through structural 
measures will end up strengthening or weakening the overall economic-governance framework.  
The European Parliament should in this context become a forum in which information is exchanged 
and its role of watchdog for the relationship between the Commission and the Council made more 
visible and effective. A clearer involvement of the European Parliament would also offset current 
legitimacy concerns at the input and at the output level. 
To address both the effectiveness and legitimacy concerns, a wider Economic Dialogue with the 
European Semester playing a central role should be put in place. We envisage an Economic Dialogue 
with the Commission and the President of the European Council that largely mimics the European 
Central Bank’s Monetary Dialogue. The President of the European Council and the Trio-Presidencies 
should be required, in the framework of this Dialogue, to inform the European Parliament of their own 
and other countries’ progress in complying with the new procedures, to make sure that efforts are 
equally distributed and the underlying conditions for successful coordination not compromised. At 
the end of each Semester cycle, the European Parliament should have the power to hold both the 
Commission and the Council accountable for the final country-specific recommendations that would 
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be sent to each Member State. The Dialogue’s format could be similar to that of the Monetary 
Dialogue with regular discussions between the European Parliament, the Commission and the 
President of ECOFIN on the preparation and follow-up of the AGS and the related country-specific and 
horizontal recommendations. These discussions should be public in order to raise the Semester’s 
public profile. However, the timing of such discussions cannot be random and needs to be precisely 
defined. Moreover, the European Parliament also needs to adapt to get the best out of the Economic 
Dialogue. 
More detailed practical recommendations for the involvement of the European Parliament are given 
in the next section. 
After the Council has issued the policy recommendations to Member States, the European Parliament 
should hold the Council and Commission accountable for their actions. This should involve 
demanding a clear justification from the Council on why the Commission's recommendations have 
been changed. This justification should be given in a public hearing to the respective Committee of 
the Parliament. In the case of a euro-area country, the Eurogroup president should present the 
decision of the Council, while in the case of a non-euro area country, the rotating presidency should 
appear before the Committee. Moreover, the European Parliament should also hold the European 
Commission accountable by calling on the responsible Commissioner to testify before the 
Parliament (i) on the initial recommendations given and (ii) on whether the Council has adopted 
these recommendations. 
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8. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The experience of the first year with the European Semester indicates a number of areas of 
improvement. First, preliminary evidence on compliance with the Semester’s new procedures shows 
that the Member States in our sample have adapted differently to the new process. If it is persistent, 
cross-country variation in the speed of institutional adaptation may create political tensions in the 
Council. Second, at the level of national Parliaments, the main impact of the European Semester so 
far has been on the level of consideration of a Government’s SCPs, and on the timing of when 
discussions took place within Parliamentary Committees. Overall, the Semester’s legitimacy remains 
rather weak. Third, it will be of key importance that the integration of policy recommendations does 
not come at the cost of diluting the stringency of fiscal and structural surveillance. Fourth, also for 
the new governance set-up, political commitment remains of central importance.  
A more precise definition of the role of the European Parliament in the Semester process will help to 
address at least some of the challenges outlined above. While we believe that the European 
Parliament can make an important contribution to enhancing both the effectiveness and the 
legitimacy of the Semester, we found that there is no room for obtaining the same results by 
strengthening, let alone changing, the nature of the collaboration between National Parliaments and 
the European Parliament. In detail, we recommend the following:  
• As already happened this year, the European Parliament should have a discussion about the 
AGS to influence the subsequent (European) Council discussions. The President of the 
European Parliament should have a clear mandate from the European Parliament when 
participating in the European Council. 
• The plenary debate on the AGS should be based on a report put together by a newly 
established European Semester Parliamentary Committee. This Committee could be 
composed of members from the Committee for Economic and Monetary Affairs, the 
Employment Committee, the Budget Committee and the Regional Policy Committee. The 
involvement of the Regional Policy Committee guarantees representation of territorial 
interests in a process that touches significantly on European regions’ future budgetary 
constraints and growth potential, but hardly involves regional actors in the planning phase, 
especially in more centralised countries. A rapporteur should be identified early on in the 
process. 
• After the Council has issued the policy recommendations to Member States, the European 
Parliament should hold the Council and Commission accountable. Did the Council follow the 
Commission recommendations? If not, why did the Council deviate and how can this 
deviation be justified? In turn, did the Commission issue pertinent and stringent 
recommendations or did the Council have to sharpen messages? The legal basis for holding 
the Commission and Council accountable is Article 121(5) TFEU. 
• Such an ex-post accountability check of the European Parliament is preferable to ex-ante 
involvement of the European Parliament in the policy formulation process for a number of 
reasons. One is that the European Parliament does not typically have the technical expertise 
to delve into the deep economic issues underlying policy recommendations. Moreover, many 
of the policy recommendations, especially when they are part of the more stringent SGP and 
EIP, constitute potentially problematic recommendations for Member States. In such 
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situations, fragmentation of the European Parliament along national lines is a risk. In 
addition, countries subject to serious imbalances are likely to remain in the different 
procedures for several years. In such a cyclical game, strong accountability checks in one 
year will significantly shape the policy recommendations in the following year thereby 
increasing the power of the European Parliament. 
• In especially serious circumstances, the European Parliament should consider asking 
National Ministers to testify before it on their obligations relative to the EU. It is clear that 
National Ministers can be held accountable only to National Parliaments. However, in the 
European Semester, they have an obligation also to the EU, and the European Parliament 
could increase this obligation by calling on them to testify. To be more effective, this should 
be done only in cases of severe imbalance under the EDP or the EIP in case of serious breach 
of the Member State’s obligation. 
• The European Commission faces the challenging task of integrating analysis and policy 
recommendations across countries and policy areas while at the same time coping with a 
difficult legal set-up. We recommend that the legal separation of NRPs and Council opinions 
in the SCP should be maintained. Moreover, we encourage the European Parliament to 
increase the resources available to the European Commission to carry out effectively its 
surveillance mandate and to ensure that cross-directorate collaboration is as effective as 
possible. 
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ANNEX I : ANNUAL GROWTH SURVEY
Three priorities: 
 
1. Fiscal consolidation 
2. Labour Market Reforms 
3. Growth enhancing measures 
Ten objectives: 
 
1. Implementing a rigorous fiscal consolidation 
- Annual adjustments of structural budget balance of 0.5% of GDP 
- Public expenditure growth below the rate of medium term trend 
GDP growth 
- Set expenditure path 
- Front load structural budget deficits 
- Increase taxes (indirect, enlarge tax basis, eliminate subsidies) 
2. Correcting macroeconomic imbalances 
- Decrease current account if the country is in deficit 
- Increase the domestic demand if the country is in surplus 
3. Ensuring stability of the financial sector 
- Restructure indebted banks 
- Increase bank capital requirements 
4. Making work more attractive 
- Shift taxes from labour  
- Flexible work arrangements and childcare facilities to facilitate 
participation of the second earner 
5. Reforming pension system 
- Link retirement age with life expectancy 
- Reduce early retirement schemes 
- Develop complementary private savings 
6. Getting unemployed back to work 
- Design benefits to reward return to work 
- Ensure coherence between the level of income taxes and 
unemployment benefits 
- Adapt unemployment insurance systems to business cycle 
7. Balancing security and flexibility 
- Introduce more open-ended contracts 
- Simplify the regimes for the recognition of professional 
qualifications 
8. Tapping the potential of the Single Market 
- Fully implement the service directive 
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- Remove unjustified quotas on professional services 
9. Attracting private capital to finance growth 
- EU project bonds 
- Facilitate access to finance for SMEs 
10. Creating cost effective access to energy 
- Third internal market energy package 
- Step up energy efficiency policies 
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ANNEX II: SURVEY COUNTRIES - OVERVIEW 
 Estonia Finland France Germany Hungary Ireland 
Population (million)19 1.3 5.4 65.1 81.8 10.0 4.5 
EU Membership20 2004 1995 Founding Member Founding Member 2004 1973 
Euro area Membership 2011 1999 1999 1999 No 1999 
Under programme  No No No No No but surveillance Yes 
Electoral System21 
Proportional 
Representation 
Proportional 
Representation 
Plurality 
2-tier Proportional 
Representation, 
adjustment 
seats.22 
Proportional 
Representation 
Single Transferable 
Vote 
Fiscal Governance23 Contract Contract Delegation Delegation Delegation Contract 
Duration of Government 
Budget Proposal 
Preparation24 
Early-June to End-
September 
End-December to 
Mid-September 
May-June to Early-
October 
End-December to 
End-June/Early-
July 
Mid-April to End-
September 
April to Early-
December 
Fiscal Institutions: 
Medium-Term Budgetary 
Frameworks25 
 
1.00 
 
1.60 
 
1.60 
 
1.40 
 
1.60 
 
0.60 
                                                 
19 Population measured on the 1st of January 2011 – Total. Eurostat. 
20 Year of EU entry. Http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm. 
21 Hallerberg, Mark, Strauch, Rolf, and Jurgen von Hagen (2009), Fiscal Governance in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
22 'A two-tiered electoral system is one where an upper level of seats is used to fill in the results at a lower level to make the overall distribution of seats more proportional' (Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen, 
2007. Table 1). 
23 Author calculations. 
24 Indications on the important steps in the budget preparation in the EU Member States. European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), Country Desks. 
25 Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks Index, median value, 2009. 'The index takes into account both the existence and properties of national medium-term budgetary frameworks and the preparation and 
status of Stability and Convergence Programmes. The index captures the quality of the medium-term budgetary framework through five criteria: (i) existence of a domestic medium-term framework, (ii) 
connectedness between the multi-annual budgetary targets and the preparation of the annual budget, (iii) involvement of National Parliaments in the preparation of the medium-term budgetary plans, (iv) 
existence of coordination mechanisms between general Government layers prior to setting the medium-term budgetary targets for all Government tiers, and (v) monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of 
multi annual budgetary targets.' European Commission, Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), Fiscal Governance, Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks Database. 
Http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/fiscal_governance/framework/index_en.htm. 
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Presentation of Proposal 
to the National 
Parliament26 
By the end of 
September 
Mid-September 
Before the 1st 
Tuesday of October 
Early-August 30th of September 
1st Wednesday of 
December 
Strength of Parliament in 
the Budgetary Process27 
2 5 2 4 1 0 
                                                 
26 Author Update. 
27 Survey conducted for this paper. This indicator is an ordinal score ranging from 0 to 6 based on: i) whether a Parliament can propose a budget independently of Government; ii) whether it can propose 
amendments; iii) whether those amendments are limited; iv) whether amendments face an offset rule so that increased spending must be matched with spending cuts; v) whether they are offsetting relative 
to the budget balance; and vi) whether amendments can cause the fall of Government. 
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ANNEX III: QUESTIONAIRE 
 
Questionnaire on Parliaments and the European Semester 
 
Country: XXXX  Respondent: P1 
 
This survey is intended to document the role that Member State Parliaments play in the preparation of documents for the European Union on their economic 
policies under Economic and Monetary Union. 
 
While we will use your survey in our study, we will not reveal the names of individuals who filled them out.  Your participation will be held in strictest 
confidence. 
 
1. Planning Stage of the Budget Process 
 
Member State Governments all formulate multi-annual economic plans for the European Union, which they traditionally have submitted to the European 
Commission in December or January in the form of Convergence or Stability Programmes. Prior to 2011 this meant that the European Commission would be 
evaluating budgets that Parliaments had already approved, rather than budget plans.  
 
Under the European Semester, the calendar for the submission of Member State programmes has been moved to the spring before the budget year. The 
expectation is that European consideration of a Member State’s fiscal plans will take place at the same time that a given Government is evaluating its plans. 
  
This section asks you to consider the role of your domestic Parliament in the formulation of your country’s fiscal plans both for the domestic and European 
level. The second set of questions is for the main Budgetary Committee in the lower house of Parliament. 
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1.1 Does your country use multi-annual budget programmes in addition to the Stability/Convergence Report it submits to Brussels? 
 __Yes  __No 
 
If the answer is yes, over how many years?  
 
1.2 Where are Government multi-annual government budget programmes formulated? 
 
__Coalition Agreement 
__Within the Ministry of Finance 
__Within an intergovernmental body, such as a Council that brings together leaders of central and sub-national Governments (Please explain the exact nature of 
the body in your country:________________________________________________________) 
__Other (please explain):  
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1.3 The Role of Parliament in the Formation of Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans: Plenary 
 
What role does the plenary (or full Parliament) play in the formulation of the Government’s multi-annual fiscal plans and its Stability or Convergence 
Programme? Please check a box for each year.  Please check the appropriate box. If the answer is “yes,” please indicate the approximate month the event 
takes place. 
 
 2010   2011 Expected 2012 
  No Yes 
If yes, Which 
Month? No Yes If yes, Which Month? No Yes If yes, Which Month? 
Plenary Has a Public Debate on the 
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans                   
Plenary Has a Vote on the Government's 
Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans                   
Plenary Has a Public Debate on 
Government's Stability/ Convergence 
Programme                   
Plenary Has a Vote on Government's  
Stability/Convergence Programme                   
 
 
1.4 Does the Plenary play any other role in evaluating the Stability or Convergence Programmes the Government sends to Brussels?  
 
__Yes  __No 
 
 
If yes, please explain: 
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1.5 The Role of Parliament in the Formation of Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans: Committee(s) 
 
Which Committee (or Committees) considers the Government’s budget proposal in the lower house of Parliament? Budget Committee? Finance Committee? 
Other? Please provide: 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 
Are Committee meetings usually ____secret or are they ____open to the public? If both apply, please explain: 
 
The following questions concern the role of this Committee in the setting of the country’s multi-annual plan and Stability or Convergence Programme. Please 
check the appropriate box. If the answer is “yes,” please indicate the approximate month the event takes place. 
 
  2010     2011   Expected 2012 
  No Yes 
If yes, Which 
Month? No Yes If yes, Which Month? No Yes If yes, Which Month? 
Committee Has a Debate on the 
Government's Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans                   
Committee Has a Vote on the Government's 
Multi-Annual Fiscal Plans                   
Committee Has a Debate on the 
Government's Stability or Convergence 
Programme                   
Committee Has a Vote on the Government's  
Stability or Convergence Programme                   
 
Does the relevant Committee play any other role in evaluating the Stability or Convergence Programmes the Government sends to Brussels?  
 
__Yes  __No 
 
 
If yes, please explain: 
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2. The Role of Parliament in the Annual Domestic Budget Process 
 
2.1. Can Parliament propose the annual budget independently 
of the Government? 
__Yes __No 
2.2. Can Parliament propose amendments to the Government’s 
budget? 
___Yes __No 
2.3. Are amendments to the Government’s budget limited? __Yes __No 
2.4. Are amendments offsetting in terms of expenditures? That 
is, must additional spending be matched with corresponding 
spending cuts? 
__Yes __No 
2.5. Are amendments offsetting in terms of the budget 
balance? That is, must additional spending be matched with 
corresponding spending cuts or revenue increases? 
(Difference from last questions: revenue increases also 
possible.) 
__Yes __No 
2.6. Can Parliamentary amendments cause the fall of 
Government? 
__Yes __No 
2.7. Is the treatment of expenditure and revenues made 
separately or simultaneously within Parliament? 
__Yes __No 
2.8. Is there a time limit on the passage of the budget in 
Parliament? 
__Yes __No 
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2.9 Is there a general vote on the total budget within Parliament, and if so, when? 
 
 
 
 
3. Monitoring the Implementation of the Budget  
 
3.1 What is the role of Parliament in monitoring the execution of the annual budget?  
 
3.2 Does the Government inform the Parliament of outcomes mid-year? If so, how often? 
 
 
4. Response to European Union Evaluation of Domestic Stability or Convergence Programmes 
 
4.1 Do you know of any instance where the Government proposed a new budget after it received a critical review from the Council of Ministers? 
 
__Yes  __No 
 
 
If yes, please provide details concerning what happened: 
 
5. Planned Changes/Reforms 
 
5.1 The European Semester introduces a revised review of the multi-annual budget plans of Member States. There are more details that Member States will 
have to report, and the calendar is meant to coincide with the domestic budget process. 
 
Does your Parliament plan to revise procedures at the domestic level in response to these reforms? 
 
__Yes  __No 
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If yes, please provide details: 
 
5.2 Would you think it useful for your Parliament to engage in a joint debate on the European Semester with the European Parliament? 
 
__Yes  __No 
 
Please explain your answer: 
